Skepticism Toward State Power
One of the most consistent threads in Marshall’s jurisprudence was his deep-seated skepticism toward state power in criminal proceedings. Having built his legal career battling unjust state practices - be they segregated school systems or racially biased juries - he understood all too well how the machinery of government could be manipulated to target the vulnerable. On the Supreme Court, his votes in criminal procedure cases often reflected this wariness.
Marshall joined or wrote opinions aimed at curbing police overreach under the Fourth Amendment, ensuring the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and guaranteeing meaningful appellate review under the Fourteenth Amendment. In decisions involving search and seizure, he argued that robust protections were necessary to prevent law enforcement from using invasive techniques disproportionately in disadvantaged communities. He also believed that the Warren Court’s iconic rulings - such as Miranda v. Arizona (1966) - were essential bulwarks against coercive interrogation practices.
The Death Penalty: A Moral Stance
Nowhere was Marshall’s perspective on government power more evident than in his opposition to the death penalty. He famously concurred in Furman v. Georgia (1972), which temporarily halted capital punishment in the United States, arguing that the death penalty was “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment and thus unconstitutional in all cases. He maintained that view even after the Court reinstated capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). From Gregg onward, Marshall dissented in every subsequent death penalty case, holding firm to the conviction that the practice was irreconcilable with the constitutional and moral values he believed the nation aspired to uphold.
For Marshall, capital punishment was not simply an academic or philosophical question; it had immediate real-world repercussions, disproportionately affecting racial minorities and the poor. He pointed to evidence of racial biases in sentencing decisions, as well as glaring disparities in the quality of legal representation afforded to capital defendants. These systemic flaws, in his view, eviscerated any notion that the death penalty was being fairly or reliably administered. His repeated dissents on this issue, though not adopted by a majority of the Court, became a clarion call for abolitionists and a moral reference point for future generations grappling with the same legal and ethical quandaries.
